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Special Security Report: The Militant 





. Senator John Cornyn 
United States Senate, Texas 
Eight years ago, our country was still 
coming to grips with the worst 
terrorist attacks in our history. We 
shed tears for those we lost. We 
prayed for those still missing. We 
wondered whether the next wave of 
terrorist attacks was only days or 
weeks away. 
After 9/11, our country developed 
many new policies to fight and win 
this Global War on Terror. These 
policies, then as now, should be open 
to debate by the American people, and 
subject to the review of their 
representatives in Congress. When a 
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many of those 
policies to 
change. 
Policy differences are nothing new in 
our democracy, but prosecution of 
those policy differences represents a 
dangerous and disturbing 
development. Attorney General Eric 
Holder has launched a potentially 
open-ended special counsel 
investigation into the post-9111 CIA 
interrogation program. This 
investigation could result in 
prosecutions of career intelligence 
professionals, as well as the lawyers 
who gave them good-faith legal 
advice that their activities were 
lawful. 
Prosecutions of Bush Administration 
officials might be popular with several 
left-wing fringe groups, but I had 
hoped that the Obama Administration 
would resist their influence. Earlier 
this year, White House Chief of Staff 
Rahm Emanuel said "This is not a 
time to use our energy and our time in 
looking back, and in a sense of anger 
and retribution." Other top 
Administration officials, including 
CIA Director Leon Panetta and 
Homeland Security Secretary Janet 
Napolitano, offered similar views. 
I have offered a Sense of the Senate 
resolution that expresses what most 
Americans believe to be true: we 
should not criminalize differences in 
policy, nor prosecute those who gave 
good-faith legal advice, nor punish 
See TERRORISM Pg. 4 1 
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Chemical Facilities Anti-Terrorism 
Standards: Establishing Risk-Based 
Performance Standards for the 
Security of Our Nation's Chemical 
Facilities 
By Peter Conner & John T. Hicks 
Since September 11, 200 1, the idea of 
security has drastically shifted. The 
concept of terrorist attacks that did not 
involve the perpetrators attempting to 
smuggle contraband weapons and 
bombs into the country, but rather, 
using our own society against us, has 
radically altered the way we view 
security. This view of security has 
manifested itself in increased, and 
novel, security innovations in many 
industries, to include aviation, 
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maritime, nuclear and chemical. We, 
as a country, have come to realize that 
we must protect not only our nuclear 
weapons and stockpiles, but also our 
nuclear waste. We must protect our 
airliners, and our ships and ports. And 
we must protect the thousands of 
chemical facilities that are spread 
throughout the country. Thousands of 
chemicals criss-cross this country to 
and from these facilities by air, rail 
and road. 
Fortunately, Congress, after 
establishing the Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS) and 
addressing the daunting task of 
confronting the many security issues 
within the country, recognized the 
need to increase the security for these 
many chemical facilities. The first 
step was to identify what chemicals 
were potentially dangerous, and then 
institute security standards on those 
facilities that manufactured, used, and 
stored those chemicals. The Chemical 
Facility Anti-Terrorism Standard 
(CFATS) was authorized by Congress 
in the Department of Homeland 
Security 2007 Appropriations Act. 
The Act provides DHS with the 
authority to identify, assess, and 
regulate the security of those chemical 
facilities that present the greatest risk. 
That security risk is a function of: 
consequence (the consequence of a 
successful attack on a facility); 
vulnerability (the likelihood that an 
attack on a facility will be successful); 
See CFATS Pg. 11 
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Efficacy of the Obama Policies to 
Combat Al-Qa'eda, Taliban, and 
Associated Forces- The First Six 
Months 
by Jeffrey F Addicott* 
(The complete law review article will appear 
in the Pace Law Review, Winter 2010) 
I. INTRODUCTION 
"The views of men can only be known, or guessed at, by 
their words or actions. "1 
George Washington, 1 799 
When Barack Obama ran for the office of president of 
the United States in the 2008 election against John 
McCain, a major campaign slogan was for a cry for 
"change." Of course, the promise of change crops up 
during practically every presidential campaign in 
American history and then quickly fades into oblivion 
once the winner takes office. Indeed, in terms of dealing 
with the threat of militant Islam posed by al-Qa'eda, 
Taliban, and associated forces there can be little question 
that in the first six months of his presidency, President 
Barrack H. Obama actually retained many key Bush 
Administration polices. Paradoxically, apart from 
providing additional combat troops on the ground in 
Pakistan, President Obama's promised change to, for 
example, provide a "new and comprehensive strategy for 
Afghanistan and Pakistan"2 to address the threat of 
militant Islam never materialized. 
See OBAMA Pg. 16 
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MEXICO AND LATIN-AMERICA 
The "Achilles Heel" in our National Security 
and Counterterrorism Mission 
by James Conway 
U.S. counterterrorism professionals in Washington, DC and 
elsewhere rarely raise an eyebrow when the topic of Latin-
America and terrorism are lumped in the same sentence. To 
most, even those who work the terror target, terrorism and 
Latin-America seem mutually exclusive. 
When we talk about national security and Latin-America, 
issues that normally take priority begin with drug cartels, 
paramilitary guerrilla groups, human-smuggling, arms-
trafficking and kidnappings and extortions of U.S citizens in 
the region. 
The reality is, although there is an overlap and nexus to each 
of these issues and terrorism, the threat of international 
terrorism to U.S. targets and the U.S homeland is a "clear and 
present danger". 
Since 9/11, the FBI and the U.S intelligence community has 
drilled down and increased its global surveillance and 
analysis of terrorist organizations, their cells and affiliates 
and the global linkages between these groups. In this regard, 
Latin-America continues to pop up on the radar screen. 
While Latin-America will never have the terrorism profile of 
many Middle-East, south Asia or east Africa regions, its 
proximity to the U.S. and its shared 2,000 mile porous border 
with the U.S ., should be of concern for counterterrorism 
policy-makers. 
We know from intelligence analysis that Al Qaeda (AQ), 
Hizballah and other international terrorist organizations are 
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those who relied upon that advice. 
The resolution makes clear that a 
special counsel investigation 
represents a serious abuse of our 
system of justice. 
The resolution reflects the reality that 
the CIA interrogation program was 
developed during an extraordinary 
time in our nation's history. 9/11 was 
less than a year in the past. 
Intelligence indicated that al Qaeda 
was planning another wave of attacks. 
The CIA had several top al Qaeda 
operatives in its custody. These 
terrorists had revealed some useful 
information, but they had stopped 
talking. CIA interrogators were 
convinced that these al Qaeda agents 
had additional information about plans 
to attack America and our interests 
overseas. 
The CIA at the time was under 
tremendous bipartisan pressure to 
increase its counterterrorism efforts 
and prevent the next terrorist attack. 
The House and Senate Intelligence 
Committees had concluded that the 
intelligence community did not 
"demonstrate sufficient initiative in 
coming to grips with the new 
transnational threats" in the days 
before 9/ 11 . The CIA wanted to do 
the most it could, under the law, to get 
the information our leaders needed to 
keep us safe. 
Our intelligence professionals 
believed that enhanced interrogation 
techniques could prompt some al 
Qaeda operatives to divulge additional 
information. Specifically, they 
wanted to use techniques that the 
military uses in its Survival , Evasion, 
Resistance and Escape, or SERE, 
training- including waterboarding. 
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Before using these techniques, they 
asked their superiors and the legal 
department at the CIA for advice 
about the advisability and legality of 
these techniques. CIA lawyers, in 
turn, engaged their colleagues in the 
White House as well as the 
Department of Justice's Office of 
Legal Counsel, or OLC. 
Lawyers in each of these agencies 
wrestled earnestly with the difficult 
questions presented by enhanced 
interrogation techniques. They 
acknowledged that these questions 
were "substantial and difficult." They 
looked at the law closely - and 
ultimately concluded that some of 
these techniques did not violate 
federal laws against torture. 
Enhanced interrogation techniques 
may appear controversial today, but at 
the time they received the full support 
of appropriate members of Congress. 
When she was ranking member on the 
House Intelligence Committee, for 
example, Speaker Nancy Pelosi was 
briefed on waterboarding and other 
interrogation techniques. Not only did 
she and other intelligence committee 
members not object to these practices 
at the time, they fully funded them 
through the appropriations process, 
and repeatedly asked the CIA if the 
agency needed more support to carry 
out its mission against al Qaeda. 
These techniques were approved by 
both Democrats and Republicans, and 
they saved lives. Recently a 2004 
CIA Inspector General report was 
released to the public. The report 
details the interrogation techniques 
that our front-line CIA interrogators 
used, as well as the extensive legal 
analysis and supervision under which 
these interrogations were carried out. 
The report concludes that these 
enhanced interrogation techniques 
yielded results that saved American 
lives. 
Nevertheless, the program had flaws. 
The Inspector General report details 
activities by some intelligence 
personnel that career prosecutors in 
the Bush Administration determined 
were criminal violations of law. 
These individuals have been 
prosecuted, convicted, and punished. 
Since then, career Justice Department 
prosecutors, as well as CIA leadership 
in two administrations, have reviewed 
the Inspector General report, and 
independently concluded that no 
further prosecutions are appropriate. 
CIA Director Leon Panetta put it best 
earlier this year. He said, "The 
Department of Justice has had the 
complete IG report since 2004. Its 
career prosecutors have examined that 
document-and other incidents from 
Iraq and Afghanistan-for legal 
accountability. They worked carefully 
and thoroughly, sometimes taking 
years to decide if prosecution was 
warranted or not. In one case, the 
Department obtained a criminal 
conviction of a CIA contractor. In 
other instances, after Justice chose not 
to pursue action in court, the Agency 
took disciplinary steps of its own." 
The decisions of career prosecutors 
and CIA supervisors should be 
respected . Our nation's intelligence 
gathering capabilities and national 
security should be preserved. In the 
coming weeks, I hope the United 
States Senate will adopt my resolution 
calling for an end to political 
prosecutions, and that the Justice 
Department will heed that call. 
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Back in 2004, STRATFOR 
began publishing reports 
noting that militants -
primarily Islamist militants 
- were changing their target 
set. We observed that after 
9/ 11 , increased situational 
awareness and security 
measures at hard targets like 
U.S. government or military 
facilities were causing 
militants to gravitate 
increasingly toward more 
vulnerable soft targets, and 
that hotels were particularly 
desirable targets. Indeed, by 
striking an international hotel 
in a major city, militants can 
make the same kind of 
statement against the West as 
they can by striking an 
embassy. Hotels are often full 
of Western business travelers, 
diplomats and intelligence 
officers. This makes them 
target-rich environments for 
militants seeking to kill 
Westerners and gain 
international media attention 
without having to penetrate 
the extreme security of a hard 
target like a modern embassy. 
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In early 2005, STRATFOR 
began writing about another 
trend we observed: the 
devolution of al Qaeda and 
the global jihadist movement 
from an organizational model 
based on centralized 
leadership and focused global 
goals to a more amorphous 
model based on regional 
franchises with local goals 
and strong grassroots 
support. As a result of this 
change, the less professional 
local groups receive less 
training and funding. They 
often are unable to attack 
hard targets and therefore 
tend to focus on softer targets 
- like hotels. 
Following several attacks 
against hotels in 2005 -
most notably the multiple 
bombing attacks in Amman, 
Jordan, and Sharm e)-Sheikh, 
Egypt - we updated our 
2004 study on the threat to 
hotels to include tactical 
details on these attacks. Now, 
following the November 
2008 Mumbai attacks and the 
July 2009 Jakarta attacks, we 
are once again updating the 
study. 
The most likely method of 
attack against a hotel is still 
an improvised explosive 
device (lED), whether 
vehicle-borne (VBIED), 
planted ahead oftime or 
deployed by a suicide 
bomber in a public area. 
However, after the Mumbai 
attacks, the risk of a 
guerrilla-style armed assault, 
including the use of high-
powered assault rifles and 
explosives against multiple 
targets within a given radius, 
became quite high. The 
relative success of the 
Mumbai operation and the 
dramatic news coverage it 
received (it captured the 
world 's attention for three 
days) mean that copycat 
attacks can be expected. 
Additionally, attacks 
targeting specific YIPs 
remain a possibility, and 
hotels are likely venues for 
such attacks. 
The Shift to Soft Targets 
One of the important results 
of the Sept. 11 attacks was 
the substantial increase in 
counterterrorism programs, 
including security measures 
and countersurveillance 
around government and 
military facilities in response 
to the increased threat 
environment. The attacks had 
a similar impact at U.S. and 
foreign airports. The 
effective "hardening" of such 
facilities -which in the past 
had topped the list of 
preferred targets for mil itant 
attacks - has made large-
scale strikes against such 
targets measurably more 
difficult. 
As a result, there has been a 
rise in attacks against lower-
profile "soft targets" -
defined generally as public or 
semi-public (some degree of 
restricted access) facilities 
where large numbers of 
people congregate under 
relatively loose security. Soft 
targets include various forms 
of public transportation, 
shopping malls, corporate 
offices, places ofworship, 
See HARD TARGETS Pg. 6 
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schools and sports venues, to name a 
few. 
Between the first World Trade Center 
(WTC) bombing on Feb. 26, 1993, and 
the second attack on Sept. 11, 2001, a! 
Qaeda focused primarily on hitting hard 
targets, including: 
Nov. 13, 1995: A U.S.-Saudi 
military facility in Riyadh, 
Saudi Arabia, where two 
VBIEDs exploded. Seven 
people, including five 
Americans, were killed. 
Aug. 7, 1998: U.S. embassies in 
Nairobi, Kenya, and Dares 
Salaam, Tanzania, were attacked 
with large VBIEDs. More than 
250 people were killed and 
5,000 injured. 
Oct. 12, 2000: The USS Cole 
was attacked with a suicide lED 
in a small boat while harbored 
in a Yemeni port. Seventeen 
sailors were killed in the attack. 
After Sept. 11, there was a marked shift 
in attacks consistent with one of a! 
Qaeda's key strengths: adaptability. The 
enumeration of a! Qaeda-linked militant 
strikes since then reads like a laundry 
list of soft targets. While there have also 
been attacks - both foiled and 
successful- against harder targets like 
embassies since Sept. 11, the present 
trend of attacking softer targets (and 
specifically hotels) is unmistakable. 
Since the start of2008, we have seen 
the following attacks: 
• 
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Jan. 14, 2008: At approximately 
6:30p.m. local time, three 
militants opened fire on security 
guards with AK-47s and hand 
grenades on the perimeter of the 
Serena Hotel in Kabul , 
Afghanistan. A suicide bomber 
then made his way inside the 
hotel before detonating the lED 
he was wearing. A local Tali ban 
spokesman quickly claimed the 
attack, which killed six people 
and injured six more. 
Nov. 26, 2008: Attackers armed 
with rifles and grenades 
stormed the Oberoi Trident and 
Taj Mahal Palace hotels in 
Mumbai, India. Over the course 
of the three-day siege, 71 
people were killed and more 
than 200 were injured. The 
attackers belonged to the 
militant group Lashkar-e-Taiba. 
July 17, 2009: Two suicide 
bombers belonging to a Jemaah 
Islamiyah splinter group 
detonated IEDs nearly 
simultaneously in the adjacent 
JW Marriott and Ritz-Carlton 
hotels in Jakarta, Indonesia. 
Nine people were killed and 42 
were wounded in the attacks. 
The bombs had been assembled 
in the hotel room of the JW 
Marriott where one of the 
attackers had been staying. This 
trend toward seeking out soft 
targets will continue as Islamist 
militant cells become even more 
autonomous and "grassroots" 
jihadists (al Qaeda sympathizers 
who may lack training or direct 
connection to al Qaeda but are 
dangerous nonetheless) become 
more numerous in various 
regions. The emergence of 
regional a! Qaeda franchises 
such al Qaeda in the Islamic 
Maghreb and a! Qaeda in Iraq in 
recent years has further 
supported this trend. 
STRATFOR has even begun to 
see these regional franchises 
develop more autonomous and 
localized cells. 
The downside of hitting soft targets, 
from the jihadists' perspective, is that 
such strikes usually have limited 
political and ideological mileage. 
Islamist militants prefer targets with 
high symbolic value, but they have 
proved willing to forego some degree of 
symbolism in exchange for a higher 
chance of success. Attacks against 
certain soft targets, such as synagogues 
and large Western hotels, can at times 
provide the necessary combination of 
symbolism and a high (primarily 
Western and Jewish) body count. 
The Threat to Hotels 
Hotels are the quintessential "soft 
targets." The nature ofthe hospitality 
business necessitates a level of 
openness in hotels. Not only guests 
staying in rooms there but also patrons 
using facilities such as bars, gyms and 
boutiques (which are often only found 
in large, luxury hotels in developing 
countries and attract a western clientele) 
expect to enter and leave the hotels 
freely - something that greatly hinders 
the ability to monitor who is entering 
and leaving a hotel. It is also not 
uncommon to see unattended luggage in 
lobbies or even unattended cars in 
driveways of luxury hotels - giving 
militants more opportunities to plant 
explosive devices. 
Although hotel security workers do 
occasionally monitor and confront 
suspicious loiterers, militants have 
found that one way around this is to 
check into hotels, which gives them full 
access and guest privileges. The 
bombers who conducted the July 17 
twin suicide bombings ofthe JW 
Marriott and the Ritz-Carlton in Jakarta, 
Indonesia, had checked into the hotel 
two days prior to carrying out the 
operation. 
For jihadists, the 
ideological 
justifications for 







immorality thatjihadists condemn on 
religious grounds. Financially, jihadist 
attacks on hotels can severely hurt a 
country's tourism industry hitting at the 
state's revenue stream. 
Ultimately, security rests primarily in 
the hands of hotel workers and private 
security guards. Government security 
forces do not have the capacity to 
protect hotels -especially in countries 
that face a myriad of security threats 
(and thereby the countries most likely to 
be attacked). However, many large 
hotels and hotel chains have been 
unwilling to incur the direct costs 
See THREAT P . 7 
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associated with hardening security, such 
as hiring more and better-trained 
guards. Guards and other employees are 
rarely trained in countersurveillance 
techniques, which could be the most 
cost-effective method of preventing an 
attack. 
Quantifying the Threat 
A comparison of the number of major 
attacks against hotels in the eight years 
before 9111 and the eight years since 
provides an interesting illustration of 
the trend we have been discussing. For 
the purpose of this study, we are 
defining a major attack as one in which 
one or more IEDs detonated or a hotel 
received rocket or mortar fire; an armed 
assault (like Mumbai); or a non-lED or 
rocket attack that resulted in casualties. 
These statistics include only attacks that 
could be defined as being perpetrated 
by militants (all militants, not just 
Islamist militants) or separatist groups. 
It does not include attacks conducted by 
any country's military forces. 
There were major attacks against 30 
hotels in 15 different countries in the 
eight years preceding 9111 . For 
comparison, during the eight years after 
9/11 the number of major attacks 
against hotels has more than doubled; 
62 attacks have occurred in 20 different 
countries. 
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The number of people injured in attacks 
on hotels after 9111 is nearly six times 
the number of people injured in the 
eight years before 9/11 . Additionally, 
fatalities in hotel attacks have increased 
six and a half times in the eight years 
Fall2009 
after 9/11 compared to the number of 
fatal ities in the same period before 9111. 
INJURIES AND FATALITI ES BEFORE VS . AFTER 9 / 11 
C-ctJI'ithtSfMTfOA2009 -w.STRAUOl.tom 
This data clearly shows that hotels have 
become increasingly popular soft 
targets for militant groups. 
The Tactics 
Hotels figure prominently as targets in a 
long list of successful attacks using 
either VBIEDs or human suicide 
bombers. Following the Mumbai 
attacks, armed assaults, assassinations 
and kidnappings at hotels also should be 
considered as an increasingly 
significant risk for hotels as well. 
IEDs 
The most substantial threat comes from 
IEDs -- either VBIEDs detonated at 
hotel entrances, inside a garage or other 
perimeter locations, or an lED used by a 
suicide bomber who aims to detonate 
within a lobby, restaurant or other 
public gathering place inside the hotel. 
Against unsecured targets, VBIEDs 
generate the greatest number of 
casualties. VBIED attacks targeting 
hotels have occurred in Karachi, 
Pakistan (May 2002); Mombasa, Kenya 
(November 2002); Jakarta, Indonesia 
(August 2003); Taba, Egypt (October 
2004); Pattani, Thailand (March 2008); 
Bouira, Algeria (August 2008); 
Islamabad (September 2008); Peshawar, 
Pakistan (June 2009); and Beledweyne, 
Somalia (June 2009). 
VBIEDs pack a bigger punch but are 
less precise and can be thwarted by 
putting up vehicle barricades and 
checkpoints. They also are not as 
maneuverable as individual suicide 
bombers traveling on foot. 
Smaller IEDs are proving to be more 
effective at killing foreigners because, 
although a larger quantity of explosives 
will create a larger explosion, the 
impact of a blast is determined solely 
by placement. If a bomber can carry a 
smaller explosive device into the center 
of a heavily trafficked area- such as a 
hotel lobby or restaurant - it will result 
in more casualties than a larger device 
detonated farther away from its 
intended target. 
Attacks using suicide bombers equipped 
with smaller IEDs have occurred inside 
and outside hotels in Phnom Penh, 
Cambodia (July 2001); Jerusalem 
(December 2001); Netanya, Israel 
(March 2002); Bogota (December 
2002); Casablanca, Morocco (May 
2003); Moscow (December 2003); 
Kathmandu, Nepal (August 2004); 
Taba, Egypt (October 2004); Amman, 
Jordan (November 2005); Peshawar, 
Pakistan (May 2007); and Kabul, 
Afghanistan (January 2008). 
In both types of attacks, the majority of 
those killed or injured were just inside 
or outside the hotel lobbies or on the 
ground floors, with some impact also to 
the hotels' lower floors . Many ofthe 
deaths and injuries resulted from flying 
glass. Protective window film prevents 
glass from shattering in the event of a 
blast; without it, the glass cracks and 
falls in large sections. Using window 
film is a cost-effective way of lowering 
the death toll in this kind of attack. 
Indeed, from photos we have seen, the 
use of protective window film in Jakarta 
seems to have been very effective at 
controlling the glass fragments. 
Armed Assaults 
Assaults employing small arms and 
grenades have long been a staple of 
modern terrorism. Such assaults have 
been used in many well-known terrorist 
attacks conducted by a wide array of 
actors, such as the Black September 
operation against the Israeli athletes at 
the 1972 Munich Olympics; the 
December 1975 seizure ofthe 
Organization of the Petroleum 
Exporting Countries headquarters in 
Vienna, led by Carlos the Jackal ; the 
December 1985 simultaneous attacks 
See HOTELS Pg. 8 
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against the airports in Rome and Vienna 
by the Abu Nidal Organization; and 
even the December 2001 attack against 
the Indian Parliament building in New 
Delhi led by Kashmiri militants. 
Most recently, the Nov. 26, 2008, 
assault against the Oberoi-Trident Hotel 
and the Taj Mahal Hotel in Mumbai,. 
India, by some 10 militants ar~ed With 
automatic rifles and grenades k1lled 71 
people and injured nearly 200 at the 
hotels (though there were many other 
casualties at other sites the gunmen 
attacked). This incident showed how an 
active-shooter situation carried out by 
well-trained militants can cause more 
casualties than some VBIEDs. 
Security personnel in most hotels 
around the world would have been 
sorely outgunned in any of these 
situations and generally are not 
equipped to deal with active-shooter 
scenarios. Subsequently, they fall back 
on local law enforcement authorities -
which can be problematic in several 
regions around the world. As seen in 
Mumbai, inept or inadequately armed 
first responders can lead to prolonged 
active-shooter situations and lead to 
hostage situations as well. 
Given the relative success of the 
Mumbai operation - in casualties, 
negative economic impact, 
psychological impact and media 
coverage- similar armed assaults are 
likely to gain popularity in the jihadis~ 
community. We anticipate that they will 
be employed against hotels and similar 
soft targets elsewhere. 
Kidnappings and Assassinations 
While bombings remain a favored tactic 
globally, the number ofkidnappings ~nd 
assassinations has increased as Islam1st 
militants adapt to changing 
circumstances. As events around the 
world- particularly in Iraq, North 
Africa, Afghanistan and the Philippines 
-have shown, jihadists have adopted 
8 
kidnappings, often followed by murder, 
as a symbolic act and, to a lesser 
degree, a way of raising funds . Even 
high-profile individuals who have 
constant security protection while 
traveling generally are more vulnerable 
at hotels than elsewhere. Though 
security teams can be deployed ahe~~ of 
time to protect the sites that YIPs VISit 
during the day, many times coverage is 
reduced when the VIP is considered 
"safe" in his or her hotel room. 
The planning and creativity militant 
groups could employ in an attack 
against a VIP at a hotel should not be 
underestimated. Such threats can be 
identified and neutralized by the 
implementation of the proactive tools of 
protective intelligence, which allows a 
person to act instead of react to preserve 
his or her personal safety. 
Attacks on YIPs at hotels should not be 
thought of as merely theoretical. In fact, 
hotels have been onjihadists ' radar 
screens for nearly two decades, as 
evidenced by the New York City 
landmark bomb plot. After the first 
WTC bombing in 1993, authorities 
uncovered several plots that centered on 
attacks against YIPs at the U.N. Plaza 
Hotel and the Waldorf Astoria Hotel in 
New York City. Ramzi Yousef(the 
mastermind of the WTC bombing) and 
the local militant cell had conducted 
extensive surveillance ofthe hotels, 
both inside and out, and outlined 
several attack scenarios. It would be 
foolish to discount these plans today, as 
al Qaeda is known to return to past 
targets and scenarios. In the New York 
plots, operatives had devised the 
following scenarios: 
Using a stolen delivery van, an 
attack team would drive the 
wrong way down a one-way 
street near the Waldorf"well," 
where VIP motorcades arrived. 
As a diversionary tactic, a lone 
operative would toss a hand 
grenade from the church across 
the street. A four-man assault 
team (a tactic used in al Qaeda 
attacks in Saudi Arabia and 
elsewhere) would deploy from 
the rear of the van and attack 
the protection cars and then the 
YIP's limousine. 
• Assailants wearing gas masks 
and armed with assault 
weapons, hand grenades and 
tear gas would infiltrate the 
hotel after midnight -when 
they knew protection levels 
were lower- and take the 
stairs to the YIP's floor, 
attacking the target in his room. 
Militants would steal hotel 
uniforms and infiltrate a 
banquet via the catering kitchen, 
which is always chaotic. 
Follow-up analyses by counterterrorism 
authorities determined that these 
scenarios would have carried a 90 
percent success rate, an? the target~d 
VIP - along with multiple protectiOn 
agents- would have been killed. 
In the aftermath of the New York City 
bomb plots, intelligence also indicated 
that elements associated with al Qaeda 
had planned to detonate car bombs at 
hotels where high-value targets were 
staying. 
Recommendations 
The first step for large hotel operators in 
dealing with this threat is to undertake a 
vulnerability assessment to identify 
properties that are most likely to be at 
risk. Such an assessment - based 
primarily on the geographic location of 
assets and an understanding of Islamist 
militants ' goals, methodologies and 
areas of operations -will allow 
companies to focus their time and 
resources on the most vulnerable 
properties, while more generally 
ensuring that security measures do not 
overshoot or undershoot the threat level 
for a particular property. This allows for 
a better, more efficient use of resources. 
For high-threat properties, the next step 
is usually a physical security survey to 
identify specific weaknesses and 
vulnerabilities. In some cases, 
diagnostic protective surveillance can 
help ensure that properties are not 
currently under hostile surveillance. 
Some kind of ongoing protective 
surveillance program is the best means 
of interdicting hostile actions. 
Because ofthe very large number of 
potential targets in most locations_, the 
implementation of some very ba~1c but 
visible measures might be sufficient to 
See SECURI'IY P . 9 
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send an attacker on to the next possible 
target. These security enhancements 
include: 
• 
A greater number and greater 
visibility of guards (including 
armed guards) inside and 
outside the building. 
Prominently placed security 
cameras around the perimeter 
and throughout the hotel. Even 
if the tapes are not monitored by 
guards trained in 
countersurveillance techniques, 
they can help identify 
suspicious activity or deter 
hostile surveillance. 
Landscaping in front of and 
around the hotel that prevents 
vehicles from directly 
approaching the entrance or 
actually entering the building -
for example, large cement 
flower pots that can stop 
vehicles, hills with rocks 
embedded in them and palm 
trees. 
Other security measures might be 
appropriate in medium- and high-threat 
level locations: 
If possible, increase the standoff 
distance between the hotel and 
areas of vehicular traffic. 
Physical barricades are among 
the most effective deterrents to 
VBIEDs, as they help to keep 
drivers from crashing through 
the doors of a hotel and 
detonating explosives in high-
traffic areas. 
In higher-threat level locations, 
use static surveillance around 
the hotel's perimeter. In areas of 
lesser threats, roving vehicles 
patrolling the perimeter at 
varying times might be 
sufficient to spot suspicious 
activity and to deter attackers. 
The following measures are 
recommended for all areas: 
• 
Protective window film: This 
should be used throughout the 
hotel. Because it reduces the 
amount of flying glass from 
explosions, it is one of the best 
and most cost-effective ways of 
minimizing casualties in the 
event of an attack. 
Protective surveillance: In all 
areas, hotel owners should 
consider hiring protective 
surveillance teams dedicated to 
this purpose. There are also 
some highly effective resources 
available that can be used to 
tum a hotel's video cameras into 
proactive tools rather than 
merely reactive resources. 
Employee education: At 
minimum, hotels should train 
employees, especially doormen 
and other ground-level 
employees, in basic protective 
surveillance techniques. 
Liaisons: Maintain a good 
working relationship with local 
police and other relevant 
authorities. Identifying hostile 
surveillance is useless unless a 
plan is in place to deal with it. 
Sound relationships with local 
police and other agencies-
such as foreign embassies -
can help facilitate information 
sharing that could uncover 
previously unknown threats. 
Though authorities might not be 
able to spare resources to 
monitor a hotel, in many places 
they will respond quickly to 
reports of suspected 
surveillance activity to confront 
suspicious people and possibly 
head off an operation. 
Background checks: The ability 
to share guest lists with local 
authorities for comparison with 
a militant watch list could help 
determine if a registered guest is 
engaging in preoperational 
surveillance. Additionally, 
background checks should be 
conducted routinely on hotel 
employees in an attempt to 
weed out possible militants. 
Copyright STRATFOR 2009. 
Republished With Permission. 
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and the threat (the intent and capability of an adversary in 
respect to attacking a facility). 
Congress, through this legislation, is directing 
chemical facilities to undergo a series of risk assessments 
aimed at identifying potential terrorist targets. CFATS 
identifies about 323 chemicals, called chemicals of interest 
or COis. A very important distinction about CFATS is that 
it does not just affect the chemical or petrochemical 
industries. It includes industries such as chemical 
manufacturing, storage and distribution, energy and 
utilities, agriculture and food, paints and coatings, 
explosives, mining, electronics, plastics and healthcare; 
basically any industry which manufactures, uses, or stores 
in of the COis listed in CFATS. For now, CFATS does not 
apply to facilities under the jurisdiction of the Maritime 
Transportation Security Act (MTSA); Department of 
Defense facilities, facilities regulated by the Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission, or EPA regulated public water 
systems and wastewater treatment facilities (MTSA 
facilities may soon fall under CFATS as per H.R. 2828 to 
be discussed later). 
Facilities identified by DHS as falling under 
CF ATS must complete a screening process for potentially 
dangerous materials, identifying their vulnerabilities 
through a security vulnerability assessment (SVA) and 
then, pursuant to that assessment, developing a site 
security plan (SSP). This process was designed to narrow 
down the more than 32,000 facilities that were determined 
to meet the thresholds of the 
different COis. 7,000 facilities 
were required to submit an SVA. 
This assessment was designed to 
rank each of the facilities, based 
on a classified set of criteria, into a 
four-tier structure with facilities 
with the highest levels of CO Is 
and vulnerabilities into tier one 
and those with the lowest into tier 4. According to DHS, 
as of July 2009 195 facilities have been assigned to Tier 1, 
678 facilities to Tier II, 609 facilities to Tier III, and 3,918 
facilities to Tier IV. Tier I facilities were notified in May 
2009 of their status and now are required to submit a Site 
Security Plan (SSP). 
The SSP is based upon eighteen risk based 
performance standards (RBPS). These standards were 
explicitly set by Congress with the intent of allowing each 
individual facility the flexibility to address their own 
Fall2009 
unique security challenges. These performance standards, 
versus dictated standards, help to increase the overall 
security of the entire industry since the security 
implemented by each individual facility will differ, 
presenting a new and unique challenge to any one 
attempting to penetrate the security measures. Each of the 
four tiers has a specific set of standards to meet, ranging 
from a the very strict standards ofTier I to the more 
relaxed, yet still secure, Tier IV standards. The eighteen 
RBPSs range from perimeter security, shipping and 
receiving, theft, cyber, monitoring, training, reporting, 
response, and records. 
As the first RBPS listed in 
the Guidance provided to 
facilities , perimeter security is the 
literal first, physical line of 
defense. As such, it is imperative 
that facility security implementors 
be educated about the newest, and 
best intrusion detection systems including fiber-based 
fencing, video analytics and radar detection. Another issue 
is going to be cost for many of these facilities. These 
facilities must take advantage of the flexibility given them 
by DHS and Congress and become creative in their 
approach to meeting the threshold standards set by the tier 
assigned to them. Qual-tron, Inc. provides compact, 
lightweight, portable intrusion detection systems that can 
assist with facilities to reach their threshold standards at 
lower costs than some traditional security measures (such 
as fences) would require. This is just one example of 
using creativity to achieve the results required by CFATS. 
This can be especially cost effective when a Tier 1 facility 
is collocated with a Tier 3 facility and avoid a large capital 
outlay for erecting fencing estimated at $3,900,000 versus 
a $250,000 by one petrochemical operator. Their solutions 
are especially effective a petrochemical facilities in remote 
locations. 
Once SSPs have been developed and implemented, 
D HS will conduct regular, surprise visits of all CF ATS 
facilities , with Tier I facilities being inspected more 
frequently. These inspections will help DHS ensure 
compliance of the high-risk chemical facilities and 
promote the highest level of security possible. Another 
measure implemented by some petrochemical operators is 
to conduct surprise detection and interdiction by canine 
patrols. American K-9 provides canine surveillance for 
See K-9 Pg. 12 
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illegal drug and explosives possession for petrochemical 
CFATS, as well as federal, corporate, and community 
institutions. All canine teams are trained and certified to 
federal standards. American K-9 works in partnership with 
the petrochemical operators along with homeland defense 
organizations, law enforcement, and corporate security 
departments to provide safe workplace environments and 
public facilities. Another security practice is the use of K -9 
patrols for incoming feedstock for the detection and 
interdiction of contraband such as explosives and illicit 
drugs. 
The current CF ATS authorization expires on 
October 20, 2009. There are currently two bills in the 
House of Representatives to reauthorize CFATS. H.R. 
24 77 would merely extend the authorization of the existing 
interim CFATS legislation through October 1, 2012. H.R. 
2868 would revise the current legislation. The bill 
includes new provisions for inherently safer technology 
requirements for Tier I and Tier II facilities. It also would 
require facilities currently regulated by the Maritime 
Transportation Safety Act of2002 (MTSA) to submit 
screening information to see ifthey would fall under 
CFATS. If so, then they would be required to revise its 
vulnerability assessments and facility security plans to 
comply with CFATS requirements as well as MTSA. 
AMK9 AMERICAN K-9 DETECT ION SERV ICES tf fAi>l l \\I ''I OF WORI WID£ Sf (' ll 
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while moderating a 
documentary entitled 
The Third Jihad, which concerns the goals 
and objectives of radical Islamic terrorism 
targeted at Western democracies 
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Professor Addicott testifies before the Senate Committee on 
the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Administrative Oversight and 
the Courts hearing entitled: "What Went Wrong: Torture and 
the Office ofthe Legal Counsel in the Bush Administration," 
Washington, DC, on May 12, 2009. 
Professor Addicott 
answers questions from 
a student at a Federalist 
Society presentation on 
the Obama 
Administration's 
approach to the War on 
Terror before the St. 
Mary's Law student 
body, October 8, 2009. 
Professor Addicott 
speaks to attendees of 
the Senior Executive 
Seminar at the 
George C. Marshall 





September 16, 2009. 
New Research Fellows hit the 
ground running as the start of the 
year for the Center brings numerous 
new projects, to include establishing 
a cyber law studies program, a 
Cyber Security conference in March 
2010, a Narco-Terrorism conference in coordination with Texas 
A&M International University, and numerous papers and law 
review articles to be published. 
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Terrorism Around The World 
Terrorism is pervasive in our world. It is not concentrated in one area or region. The field of Terrorism Law must keep 
up with the ever-changing and evolving world that is before us. New developmen ts within the field of Terrorism Law 
and throughout the world can drastically alter our understanding of what Terrorism Law is. For this reason, we will 
highlight relevant developments and legal cases in "Terrorism Around the World." 
Scotland Frees Lockerbie Bomber 
On September 17, 2009 the man convicted for the bombing of Pan Am flight 103 was freed by Scotland on 
compassionate grounds. Abdel Baset al-Megrahi, was diagnosed with prostate cancer and has been given only 
months to live. He was convicted in 2001 for being a participant in the terrorist bombing that killed 270 people, 
including 11 people that were on the ground when the airplane crashed in the town of Lockerbie, Scotland. The White 
House did not agree with the decision of the Scottish government releasing Al-Megrahi, who only served eight years 
of a life sentence. U.S. family members of the victims were outraged, as AI- Megrahi returned to Libya. 
Marines Locate Insurgents' Underground Passages 
U.S. Marines have begun investigating a series of tunnels in Afghanistan connected to a series of ancient wells known 
as the Karez System. They are using both manpower and robots to observe the insides of these tunnels. These tunnels 
have been around for hundreds to thousands of years. During the exploration of these connecting tunnels, Marines 
have seen signs of human activity. Trash, weapons and lED-making materials have been found among other objects. 
These tunnels are and have been used by insurgents to hide and transport supplies The exploration of these tunnels has 
drawn heavy attention, but the goal remains clear. The United States is finding better ways to cut the covert 
transportation of supplies and movement of insurgents. The only problem is that the tunnel system cannot be 
destroyed without ruining the farmers' means of irrigation in the area; so Marines are exploring other ways to solve 
this problem. 
Men Accused of Unrelated Bomb Plots in Illinois and Texas 
Two men, who attempted to detonate what they thought were explosive devices, were arrested in unrelated incidents 
~ust one day apart. Michael C. Flinton, also known as Talib Islam and a fanatic of the American-born Tali ban soldier 
John Walker Lindh, was arrested on September 23, 2009 after he attempted to detonate a van with what he believed 
were explosives, outside a federal courthouse in Springfield, Illinois. Jordanian national, Hosam Maher Husein 
Smadi, was arrested on September 24, 2009 after he parked what he thought was a car bomb in the garage of a Dallas 
skyscraper. Federal authorities stated that, in both incidents, FBI agents posing as AI Qaeda militants provided the 
men with the decoy explosives. 
Pentagon to Release Classified Terrorism-Related Materials 
The Pentagon will soon release classified terrorism-related information to State and local agencies through what are 
being called fusion centers. These centers were implemented in 2006, but were only for communication with the CIA 
and FBI. The plan is to add State and local agencies to the Department of Homeland Security's Computer Network. 
The Department of Homeland Security 's goal is to have these fusion centers in at least every State and major United 
States city. The access for State and local agencies will only be preapproved to selected staff with federal security 
clearances and will not include information on any specific United States citizens. The Department of Homeland 
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Terrorism Around The World cant. 
Security is confident that sharing information with these State and local agencies will prove beneficial in preventing 
domestic terrorist attacks. 
U.S. Releases More Uighur Detainees 
The United States has successfully convinced another country, the island nation of Palau, to accept up to 8 of the 
Uighur detainees from Guantanamo Bay. The release of these detainees has been a constant struggle since many 
countries have refused to accept anyone from this group for fear of retaliation from China. Europe has refused to take 
any unless the United States accepts some of the Uighurs, but this will not happen since the Supreme Court has 
already decided in Kiyemba v. Obama that federal district court judges do not have the power to release detainees into 
the United States. These particular detainees have been a source of controversy since they were cleared as non-
terrorists and okayed for release by the Bush Administration. The controversy surrounding the United States' holding 
of the detainees in Guantanamo Bay revolves around the fear that if the U.S. releases these detainees to China, China 
will torture them. 
Gadhafi and Chavez Sign Anti-Terrorism Declaration 
On September 28, 2009, controversial leaders Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez and Libyan dictator Moammar 
Gadhafi, signed a declaration condemning the branding, by the Western powers, some struggles against colonial 
oppression as terrorism. The declaration stated that both countries are against identifying valid struggles of "liberty 
and self-determination" as terrorism, but that it is important to combat terrorism in all its forms. Gadhafi, for the last 
40 years, has been accused of providing a haven for terrorists, allowing the existence of extremist training camps and 
supporting terrorist attacks. Recently, Gadhafi has tried to take a more conciliatory approach with the West, and states 
that his government rejects terrorism and should not be labeled as a supporter of terrorism. Both, Colombia and the 
United States, have accused the Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez of aiding the Revolutionary Armed Forces of 
Colombia (FARC), a military group that has been attempting to overthrow the Colombian government for the past 45 
years. 
Oveissi v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 573 F.3d 835 (C.A.D.C. 2009) 
The D.C. circuit court held on July 28, 2009 that the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia had jurisdiction 
over a lawsuit filed against the Islamic Republic of Iran. Amir Reza Oveissi, the grandson of a former Iranian military 
officer, brought action, under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act's (FSIA) state-sponsored terrorism exception, 
against the Islamic Republic of Iran and its Ministry of Information and Security (MOIS), alleging intentional 
infliction of emotional distress (liED) and wrongful death related to murder of his grandfather. The D.C. circuit court 
established that at the time of the attack against Oveissi 's grandfather: Iran had been designated as state sponsor of 
terrorism, the murder occurred outside Iran's borders, and Oveissi was a United States citizen; thus meeting the 
necessary criteria to satisfy the FSIA's state sponsored terrorism exception. 
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II. BUSH POLICIES ON AL-QA 'EDA, TALIBAN AND 
ASSOCIATED FORCES 
Following the al-Qa'eda terror attacks of September 11, 
2001, the Bush Administration embarked on a series of 
antiterrorism policy and legal initiatives designed to 
disrupt the Islamic terror organization (and their affiliates) 
and to prevent future terror attacks from taking place. The 
most significant and crucial legal development advanced 
by the Bush Administration was the clear view that the 
conflict with al-Qa'eda was a real "war," to be fought not 
only with the use of domestic federal criminal law, but 
with the full power of the legal rules associated with the 
law of war. Among other things, the premise that the 
United States was at war served as the rule of law 
justification to designate and detain without trial enemy 
combatants, establish and use military commissions, and 
interrogate illegal enemy combatants. 
A. The War on Terror 
The first action taken following the terrorist attacks of 
September 11,2001, was the Bush Administration's 
pronouncement that the United States was at "war." In 
tandem with this determination from the Commander in 
Chief, the phrase "War on Terror" entered the lexicon of 
both the general public and all branches of the 
government, where it remained firmly set for the next 
seven years. 
Congress identified the enemy in the War on Terror and 
voted on September 18,2001, to authorize the President to 
use armed force against "those nations, organizations, or 
persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or 
aided the terrorist attacks" against the United States on 
September 11,2001. 
B. Designating and Detaining Enemy Combatants 
In conjunction with the War on Terror, the Bush 
Administration designated certain individuals as enemy 
combatants and detained them indefinitely. Under the law 
of armed conflict an enemy combatant can be held 
indefinitely until the war is over.3 The Bush 
Administration determined that the al-Qa'eda and Taliban 
fighters were not eligible for prisoner of war (POW) status 
under the Third Geneva Convention. Since al-Qa'eda 
fighters belonged to a terrorist organization and were not 
recognized members of an armed force, they were deemed 
unlawful belligerents.4 During the Bush years, the U.S. 
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Supreme Court never overturned the premise that the 
United States was at war; therefore, the US was entitled to 
detain enemy combatants.s 
C. Military Commissions and Federal Courts 
Military commissions are non-Article III courts. They 
derive their authority from Congress' power to "define and 
punish ... offenses against the Law ofNations."6. Military 
commissions are illegal unless the nation is or has been in 
a state of armed conflict under the law of war. Under the 
Bush Administration, three al-Qa'eda fighters were tried 
by military commission and sentenced. 
D. Interrogation of Detainees 
Since the Bush Administration determined that the 
Third Geneva Convention did not apply to the detainees, 
American authorities were entitled to conduct 
interrogations so long as said questioning was conducted 
free oftorture or ill-treatment.? With the passage ofthe 
Detainee Treatment Act in 2005,8 additional uniform 
standards for interrogation were set out which expressly 
prohibited cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment of 
detainees in the custody of any U.S. agency. Then, in 
2006, the Supreme Court in Hamdan v. RumsfelcP held 
that Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions did in 
fact apply to the detainees and protected them from 
violence, outrages on personal dignity, torture, and cruel, 
humiliating, or degrading treatment. 10 The so-called 
"water boarding" interrogation technique used on three al-
Qa'eda detainees in the CIA program was determined to 
constitute a level of force that did not rise to the level of 
torture under the Torture Convention. 11 
Ill. 0BAMAPOLICIES ON AL-QA'EDA, TALIBAN, AND 
ASSOCIATED FORCES 
President Obama's desire to dismantle key elements of 
the Bush policies first came about vis a vis three executive 
orders issued on January 22, 2009. The President 
mandated: ( 1) the closure of the Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, 
detention facility within one year's time; 12 (2) the 
suspension of all ongoing military commissions; 13 and (3) 
the suspension of the CIA's enhanced interrogation 
program. 14 
See OVERSEAS Pg. 17 
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A. Overseas Contingency Operations 
Wishing to establish a new theme to describe the war, 
President Obama substituted the phrase War on Terror with 
the new label: "Overseas Contingency Operations." 
Unfortunately, the phrase failed to include the most critical 
element of all: the word "war." This is a fundamental 
ingredient that provides the clearest signal that the nation 
is using the law of war against al-Qa'eda and Taliban 
forces . 
B. Interrogation of Detainees 
President Obama publicly asserted that CIA water-
boarding was torture but then refused to take any action 
against those who authorized or carried out the 
technique. 15 Under the Torture Convention, President 
Obama was faced with a choice to either extradite the 
alleged torturer to a State that will prosecute or submit 
them for prosecution in the U.S. As of this time, he has 
refused to do either. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The War on Terror is a real war against al-Qa'eda, 
Taliban, and associated forces. As the Commander in 
Chief, it is imperative that President Obama communicates 
this fact to the American people and the world. At the very 
center of the problem is the Obama Administration's 
refusal to publicly call the conflict a war while 
simultaneously arguing to federal district court judges 
receiving petitions from detainees held in Afghanistan that 
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these fighters are in fact illegal enemy combatants and 
subject to the law of war. This confusion and lack of 
clarity only provides fuel for our enemies to perpetuate the 
false propaganda that America is acting illegally by, for 
example, detaining enemy combatants without trial and 
conducting military commissions. Ifthe events of9/ll 
have taught us anything it is that the United States must 
utilize the rule of law set out in the law of war. America 
should make this application of the rule of law crystal 
clear. 
* Distinguished Professor of Law and Director, Center for Terrorism 
Law, St. Mary's University School of Law. B.A. (with honors). 
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Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions of 1949. 
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keenly aware of Mexico as a transit point 
or conduit to the U.S. because of certain 
conditions and existing "support" entities 
that exist in Mexico. We'll discuss some 
ofthem shortly. 
Shaikh Abdullah ai-Nasifi, a Kuwaiti 
professor and AQ recruiter was seen on 
an AI-Jezeera television video in 
February of this year speaking of a 
WMD attack on a major U.S. 
metropolitan target that could cause the 
death of hundreds ofthousands of 
Americans and make 9/11 seem 
insignificant. In that speech, ai-Nafisi 
specifically mentions Mexico as the 
logical transit point into the U.S for such 
an attack. 
When Kalid Shaikh Mohammed (KSM), 
the notorious mastermind ofthe 9111 
attacks was captured, interrogated and 
debriefed over an extended period of 
time, McAllen, Texas on the U.S./ 
Mexico border and numerous references 
to Mexico were found in his documents 
and mentioned in his interviews. 
AQ suspect, Adnan ai-Shukrijumah, 
who took flight lessons in Florida along 
with the 9/11 hijackers and is considered 
by many as the 201h hijacker, remains at 
large and his whereabouts are unknown. 
It is known through investigation, that al-
Shukrijumah did pass through Panama 
on a Trinidad and Tobago passport in 
2001. 
Numerous detainees and terror suspects 
interviewed at GITMO as well as 
detention facilities in Iraq and 
Afghanistan have made references to 
Mexico and Latin-America. 
It is difficult to talk about Mexico and 
the 2,000 mile border without talking 
about illegal immigration, human 
smuggling and the link to terrorism. 
Anecdotally, it's interesting to note that 
three of the 9111 hijackers were illegal 
overstays, seven of the nineteen hijackers 
bought fraudulent ID cards from 
Hispanic day-laborers in northern 
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Virginia and two of the World Trade 
Center bombers in 1993 were also 
illegally in the U.S. DHS intelligence 
conservatively estimates that there are 
over 115,000 Middle-Easterners are in 
the U.S. illegally and over 6,000 have 
defied deportation orders and remain on 
the loose. 
MEXICO 
Mexico represents a unique, two-
pronged counterterrorism challenge. 
Although there are only about 6,000 
Muslims in Mexico and only four 
principle Muslim communities, they are 
fairly well organized, funded by Saudi 
Arabia, Pakistan and Iran as well as other 
global Islamic groups and remain 
committed to the Muslim principle of 
spreading the Da 'wa (missionary word 
oflslam) throughout the country. Of 
greater concern to terrorism officials in 
Mexico is the overwhelming presence of 
sophisticated, global human smuggling 
networks that exist and utilize Mexico as 
the final staging point for the movement 
of illegal aliens across the U.S./Mexican 
border and into the U.S. 
Throughout the 1990's, George Tajirian, 
an Iraqi and naturalized Mexican citizen 
and his Babylonian Travel Agency in 
Mexico City, provided false documents 
and smuggled thousands ofPalestinians, 
Syrians, Iraqis and other Middle-
Easterners and south Asians into the U.S. 
until his arrest and sentencing of 13 
years in a U.S. prison. 
Salim Boughader Musharraf, a Lebanese 
human smuggler who owned the 
Lebanon Cafe in Tijuana, Mexico 
smuggled hundreds of Lebanese into 
southern California until his operation 
was finally shut down in 2003 and he 
was sent away for 14 years. 
Interestingly, a key figure in his 
operation was the Mexican Consul 
General in Beirut, Lebanon, Imelda Ortiz 
Abdullah, arrested by Mexican 
authorities but then suddenly released 
two years later by a Mexican judge for 
lack of evidence. Boughader was 
notoriously known for his smuggling of 
Hizballah operative, Mahmoud Kourani 
into the U.S. Kourani, who is the 
brother of Haider Kourani, Hizballah 's 
operations chief of military security in 
Lebanon, was captured by the FBI in 
Detroit, Michigan in 2003 in possession 
of large amount of Hizballah j ihadist 
materials and video tapes. 
Mohammed Kamel Ibrahim and 
Sampson Lovelace Boateng successfully 
ran an east African human smuggling 
pipeline through Belize and into the U.S 
for about five years until they were shut 
down and arrested in 2008. This 
operation ran along with the help of a 
corrupt Mexican consulate official in 
Belize who would provide Mexican visas 
for entry into Mexico. Once in Mexico, 
the Africans were staged for smuggling 
into the U.S. by the vast array of 
"coyote" smuggling operations that exist 
in Mexico. The smuggling of east 
Africans is of concern to 
counterterrorism officials because AQ 
has increased its presence and influence 
in east Africa in recent years, particularly 
in Somalia (al-Shabab) and the Sudan. 
IRAN and HIZBALLAH 
Hizballah, the "party of God" has always 
been the world's most prolific terror 
group. Founded in 1982, in response to 
the Israeli invasion of south Lebanon, it 
is the most organized and best funded 
terror group with global reaching 
operations. As a proxy for the Iranians 
and, to a lesser extent, the Syrians, it 
receives millions in direct funding and 
arms each year. Estimates are that 
Hizballah raises over $100 million per 
year through it global web of fund-
raising and criminal activities. Most of 
that money comes from its sophisticated, 
mafia-like criminal enterprises that 
specialize in counterfeiting everything 
from U.S. currency and documents to 
blue jeans, perfumes, DVD's, CD's and 
computer software. We know AQ and 
its affiliates have been on the forefront of 
See HIZBALLAH Pg. 19 
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the terror radar screen but prior to 9/11, 
Hizballah had the blood of more 
Americans on its hands than any other 
terror group in the world going all the 
way back to the bombings of embassies, 
kidnappings and assassinations of 
Americans in the early 1980's in Beirut 
and Kuwait to the Marine Corp 
barracks, TWA 840, the LaBelle disco in 
Berlin, Khobar towers and, in some intel 
circles, a hand in the bombing ofPanAm 
103. 
In the southern cone of South America, 
Hizballah was responsible for the 
carnage of both the Israeli Embassy 
bombing in 1992 and the Jewish 
Community Center bombing in 1994 in 
Buenos Aires, Argentina. Both were 
classic Hizballah operations; PETN/ 
RDX truck bombs against somewhat soft 
symbolic targets in retaliation for the 
Israeli assassination of Hizballah leaders 
in Lebanon. 
Just to the north of Buenos Aires, the 
notorious tri-border region of Brazil, 
Argentina and Paraguay is the western 
headquarters ofHizballah, a region that 
25,000 Lebanese Arabs call home. 
Located in a remote lawless area with 
uncontrolled borders and rampant 
corruption, it is designated a commercial 
"free port" zone. It is considered the 
smuggling capital of the world and 
estimates are that over $1 00 Million in 
counterfeit goods generated each year 
end up in the coffers of Hizballah. 
Beyond presence and fundraising, 
Hizballah maintains logistical support in 
Latin-America with access to explosives, 
arms, false documents, cloned cell 
phones and stolen vehicles; all critical 
elements in terrorist operations. It has 
also been determined that Hizballah 
maintains a robust intelligence collection 
process in Latin-America with direct ties 
to Iranian intelligence. 
Endemic to many parts of Latin-
America, Hizballah is known to exploit 
regions where there are weak and poor 
Fall2009 
police and intelligence services. The 
consistent variable always found in the 
final analysis, as was the case in the 
Buenos Aires bombings, is that of 
Iranian "diplomatic" presence. The 
Islamic theocracy of Iran is deemed a 
state sponsor of terror since 1984 
because Iranian intelligence agents and 
Hizballah posing as diplomats have 
successfully conducted bombings, 
kidnappings, and assassinations around 
the world. General Amad Vahidi, former 
commander of the Iranian Revolutionary 
Guard operations wing, was a principle 
player and has been indicted in the 1994 
Jewish Community Center bombing in 
Buenos Aires. He is a fugitive from 
justice and wanted on an INTERPOL 
warrant by both Argentine and British 
authorities. Iranian President 
Ahmadinijad just named Vahidi last 
month the new Minister of Defense in 
Iran. 
Beyond Latin-America's southern cone, 
the growing presence of Iran and 
Hizballah operations throughout Latin-
America and reaching literally right into 
our own "backyard" is of increasing 
concern. The growing "love fest" 
between Iran's President Mahmoud 
Ahmadinijad and Venezuela's President/ 
Dictator Hugo Chavez has been 
memorialized in various press photos 
throughout Latin-America. A 
relationship, based in part on a mutual 
disdain for the U.S., their actions have 
become more than just a "poke in the 
eye" for Uncle Sam. Ahmadinijad is 
exploiting the ever growing left-of-center 
governments in Latin-America and is 
wooing them with all kinds of promises. 
He has established growing Iranian 
diplomatic missions and embassies in 
Brazil, Bolivia, Ecuador, Chile, 
Colombia, Uruguay and, most notably, 
with left wing leader and former U.S. 
nemesis, Daniel Ortega in Nicaragua. 
Shrewdly, the Iranians are exploiting 
their presence in Nicaragua, one of the 
poorest countries in Central America 
where electricity is rationed and the 
average person may live on $2 a day. 
Ahamdinijad has promised the 
Nicaraguans, schools, hospital, power 
plants, dams, new ports on the Caribbean 
side and over $1 Billion dollars in aid. 
Of course, none of these projects have 
materialized but the Iranians have built 
their largest Embassy in Latin-America 
in Managua with over 150 diplomats, 
most of whom were never registered 
with the Nicaraguan government 
according to a La Pres a media 
investigation in Managua. When 
interviewed recently by a journalist as to 
why Iran would establish such a broad-
based presence in Central America, I 
cynically replied that I didn't think it was 
because the Iranians had an interest in 
becoming banana farmers. 
Conclusion 
From a macro-perspective, 
counterterrorism experts will always say 
the threat of AQ and AQ-inspired groups 
remain the primary terror threat to our 
national security. Nonetheless, when we 
consider the exploitation of our vast and 
porous southern border global smuggling 
groups, the threat of the growing 
presence of Iran and Hizballah in Latin-
America, the resume and modus 
operandi of Hizballah terrorist 
operations around the globe coupled with 
the current saber-rattling over the Iranian 
nuclear issue increasing tensions in the 
Middle-East, Washington policy makers 
may want to reconsider and refocus our 
counterterrorism efforts from the 
"backwaters" of Pakistan and 
Afghanistan to that of our own 
"backyard". 
James G. Conway, Jr. is President and 
Managing Director of Global Intelligence 
Strategies, Inc., a Houston-based firm that 
consults, advises and trains government 
agencies, academia and the media on 
terrorism and national security matters as 
well as private sector corporations on 
security issues, counter-terrorism measures 
and risk mitigation. Mr. Conway, a retired 
FBI, Special Agent, was a former manger of 
counterterrorism operations for the FBI in 
Latin-America. 
19 
TERRORISM LAW REPORT 
WHAT WE ARE DOING ... 
The Center for Terrorism Law is conducting a symposium entitled Cyber Security: Legal and Policy Issues for 
ational Security, Law Enforcement and Private Industry. It will be held at St. Mary's School of Law from March 
18th thru 19th, 20 I 0. The purpose of the symposium is to provide information on a full range of issues, both legal and 
policy, related to cyber security, as well as actionable information regarding cyber security solutions and future trends. 
See www.stmar tx.edu/ctl for additional details. Seating is strictly limited to 200. 







An overview of what is a cyber threat posed by nation-states and terrorist groups 
Analysis of cyber threats specific to American business that is part of"critical infrastructure" 
Current mechanisms for dealing with cyber attacks from law enforcement perspective 
Cyber sec.urity between the government and private sector 
Review of national security doctrine and tools to conduct cyber warfare 
Legal field's development of"cyber premises liability" for businesses that suffered attack 
The Center for Terrorism Law ... 
• is developing a Cyber Studies Department to better approach the complex study of legal issues associated 
with cyberspace. It will be housed in the Center for Terrorism Law. In addition, the Center is also 
developing a section of the website to help the public with research in the area of terrorism law with 
existing case law, statutes, and other pertinent information. 
• continues to coordinate with the American Embassy Kuwait regarding the development of a university 
level (for academic credit) course at the American University of Kuwait on legal and policy matters related 
to terrorism. The tentative date for the Kuwait based event is 2009. 
• continues to coordinate cyber training initiatives with the Center for Infrastructure Assurance and Security 
(CIAS) at the University ofTexas San Antonio as well as the Cyber Innovation and Research Consortium, 
San Antonio, Texas. 
• as a participating member of the FBI's Terrorism Research and Analysis Project (TRAP), is preparing an 
article for publication entitled: Radical Islam's Manipulation of the Media. 
• is coordinating with Texas A&M International University to help develop an agenda for a national 
conference on Narco-terrorism to be held in 20 I 0 in Laredo, Texas. 
• is preparing a law review article for the Southern New England School of Law regarding the need for 
international adoption of civil litigation to deter international terrorism. 
• is currently working on an article, Terrorist Manipulation of the Media, being written by Center research 
fellows Rob Gunn and Nathaniel Fulmer, in conjunction with Professor Addicott. 
Professor Addicott will have an article published in the Pace Law Review entitled Efficacy of the Obama Policies to 
Combat Al-Qa'eda, Taliban, and Associated Forces-The First Six Months in January 20 I 0. 
On October 18, 2009 at 7pm, Professor Addicott and former Mayor Henry Cisneros moderated a documentary entitled: 
The Third Jihad, at the Bijou Theater, 5422 Fredericksburg Road, San Antonio, Texas. The documentary concerns the 
goals and objectives of radical Islamic terrorism targeted at Western democracies. For more information, please email 
i arodfei sbc lobal.net. 
On October 8, 2009, Professor Addicott addressed the World Affairs Council of San Antonio. The topic covered the 
Obama Administration's Approach to the War on Terror. 
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